#realestate, #cre, #commercialappraiser FW: Business Law Summaries Distributed January 31, 2014

#realestate, #cre, #commercialappraiser Thanks!
Curtis D. Harris, BS, CGREA, REB
Bachelor of Science in Real Estate, CSULA
State Certified General Appraiser
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310-251-3959 Cell424-218-9580 Skype WebSite: http://www.harriscompanyrec.com ;Resume: http://www.harriscompanyrec.com/commercialappraiserresume2013locked.pdf ;Commercial Appraiser Blog: http://commercialappraiser.typepad.com/blog/ ; http://harriscompanyrec.com/blog/ ;The LOoP! a Google CSE: http://www.google.com/cse/home?cx=000747579154309164948%3Annakvu69iqy ; We Make a Simple Pledge to

Communicate, in a timely fashion, each appraisal, analysis, and opinion without bias or partiality

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Hold paramount the confidential nature of the appraiser/consultant - client relationship

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Comply with the requirements of the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice and the
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IT'S THE LAW- Statement 7: Prohibition Against Discrimination
State agencies should be aware that Title XI and the Agencies' regulations prohibit federally regulated financial institutions from excluding appraisers from consideration for an assignment by virtue of their membership, or lack of membership, in any appraisal organization. Federally regulated financial institutions should review the qualifications of appraisers to ensure that they are qualified for the assignment for which they are being considered. It is unacceptable to assume that an appraiser is qualified solely due to membership in, or designation from, an appraisal organization, or the lack thereof. The Agencies have determined that financial institutions' appraisal policies should not favor appraisers from one or more organizations or exclude individuals based on their lack of such membership. If a State agency learns that a certified or licensed appraiser allegedly has been a victim of such discrimination, the State agency should inform the Agency which has regulatory authority over the involved financial institution. INCLUDING THE APPRAISAL INSTITUTE-MAICONFIDENTIALITY/PRIVILEGE NOTICE: This transmission and any attachments are intended solely for the addressee. The information contained in this transmission is confidential in nature and protected from further use or disclosure under U.S. Pub. L. 106-102, 113 U.S. Stat. 1338 (1999), and may be subject to consultant/appraiser-client or other legal privilege. Your use or disclosure of this information for any purpose other than that intended by its transmittal is strictly prohibited and may subject you to fines and/or penalties under federal and state law. If you are not the intended recipient of this transmission, please destroy all copies received and confirm destruction to the sender via return transmittal From: Justia Practice Area Opinion Summaries [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of Justia Practice Area Opinion Summaries
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Weekly Opinion SummariesBusiness Law
Weekly Summaries Distributed January 31, 2014 · Starr Int'l Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Bankruptcy, Business Law, Corporate Compliance, Government & Administrative Law, Professional Malpractice & Ethics
U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals· Inland Mortg. Capital Corp v. Chivas Retail Partners, LLC
Banking, Business Law, Contracts, Real Estate & Property Law
U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals· Bonnet v. Ute Indian Tribe
Business Law, Constitutional Law, Contracts, Native American Law
U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals· Clark v. Zwanziger
Bankruptcy, Business Law, Labor & Employment Law
U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals· Alabama Psychiatric Services, P.C. v. A Center for Eating Disorders, L.L.C.
Business Law, Health Law
Alabama Supreme Court· Muccio v. Hunt
Bankruptcy, Business Law, Contracts, Injury Law
Arkansas Supreme Court· Harman-Bergstedt, Inc. v. Loofbourrow
Business Law, Government & Administrative Law, Injury Law, Insurance Law, Labor & Employment Law
Colorado Supreme Court· Farmers Nat'l Bank v. Green River Dairy
Business Law, Commercial Law, Constitutional Law
Idaho Supreme Court - Civil· Schmutz v. Texas
Business Law, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

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Starr Int'l Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank of New YorkCourt: U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Docket: 12-5022Opinion Date: January 29, 2014Judge: Walker, Jr. Areas of Law: Bankruptcy, Business Law, Corporate Compliance, Government & Administrative Law, Professional Malpractice & Ethics Starr, AIG's former principal shareholder, filed suit against the FRBNY for breach of fiduciary duty in its rescue of AIG during the fall 2008 financial crisis. The district court dismissed Starr's claims and Starr appealed. The suit challenged the extraordinary measures taken by FRBNY to rescue AIG from bankruptcy at the height of the direst financial crisis in modern times. In light of the direct conflict these measures created between the private duties imposed by Delaware fiduciary duty law and the public duties imposed by FRBNY's governing statutes and regulations, the court held that, in this suit, state fiduciary duty law was preempted by federal common law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. http://j.st/v79 View Case on: Justia Google Scholar
Inland Mortg. Capital Corp v. Chivas Retail Partners, LLCCourt: U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Docket: 12-3648Opinion Date: January 29, 2014Judge: Posner Areas of Law: Banking, Business Law, Contracts, Real Estate & Property Law IMCC loaned Harbins $60 million to buy Georgia land to construct a shopping center. In addition to a mortgage, IMCC obtained a guaranty from Chivas, providing that if IMCC “forecloses … the amount of the debt may be reduced only by the price for which that collateral is sold at the foreclosure sale, even if the collateral is worth more than the sale price.” Harbins defaulted; IMCC foreclosed in a nonjudicial proceeding, involving a public auction conducted by the sheriff after public notice. IMCC successfully bid $7 million and filed a petition to confirm the auction. Unless such a petition is granted, a mortgagee who obtains property in a nonjudicial foreclosure cannot obtain a deficiency judgment if the property is worth less than the mortgage balance owed. A Georgia court denied confirmation. Chivas refused to honor the guaranty. A district court in Chicago awarded IMCC $17 million. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the Georgia statute “is odd by modern standards,” but does not prevent a suit against a guarantor. The agreement guaranteed IMCC the difference between what it paid for the land and the unpaid balance of the loan, even if the land is worth more than what IMCC paid for it. The agreement is lawful under Georgia and Illinois law. http://j.st/v8s View Case on: Justia Google Scholar
Bonnet v. Ute Indian TribeCourt: U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Docket: 12-4068Opinion Date: January 28, 2014Judge: Baldock Areas of Law: Business Law, Constitutional Law, Contracts, Native American Law Plaintiff Robert Bonnet is a petroleum landman who conducted business through Bobby Bonnet Land Services. In 2008, Plaintiffs entered into a written contract with the Energy and Minerals Department of the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation to serve collectively as an independent contractor and consultant. When the Tribe terminated this contract in 2009, Plaintiffs sued various companies and individuals (but not the Tribe) in federal court, alleging these defendants caused the Tribe to terminate this contract prematurely. Plaintiffs served the Tribe with a non-party subpoena duces tecum requesting documents relevant to their suit. The Tribe moved to quash the subpoena based on the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity. The district court denied the Tribe's motion, but modified the subpoena to limit or strike requests it deemed overbroad. The Tribe appealed. The issue before the Tenth Circuit was whether a subpoena duces tecum served on a non-party Tribe seeking documents relevant to a civil suit in federal court is itself a "suit" against the Tribe triggering tribal sovereign immunity. Pursuant to the collateral order doctrine, the Court concluded, yes, it is a "suit" against the Tribe. Therefore the Court reversed the district court's denial of the Tribe's motion to quash based on tribal immunity. http://j.st/vmm View Case on: Justia Google Scholar
Clark v. ZwanzigerCourt: U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Docket: 12-6123Opinion Date: January 28, 2014Judge: Tymkovich Areas of Law: Bankruptcy, Business Law, Labor & Employment Law In this appeal, the Tenth Circuit considered a novel question: Does issue preclusion apply in bankruptcy court to a final determination in district court that a party waived an issue? Upon review of the circumstances of this case and the applicable statutes, the Court concluded issue preclusion did not apply to the waiver finding here. The Court reversed the judgment of the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel and remanded this case for the bankruptcy court to reinstate its order. http://j.st/vn8 View Case on: Justia Google Scholar
Alabama Psychiatric Services, P.C. v. A Center for Eating Disorders, L.L.C. Court: Alabama Supreme Court Docket: 1110703Opinion Date: January 24, 2014Judge: Main Areas of Law: Business Law, Health Law Defendants Alabama Psychiatric Services, P.C. ("APS"), and Managed Health Care Administration, Inc. ("MHCA"), appealed the trial court's order denying their motions for a judgment as a matter of law. Although the jury entered a verdict for APS and MHCA, they nonetheless argued that two claims that were ultimately tried should not have been submitted to the jury. APS and MHCA also appealed the trial court's order granting a motion for a new trial filed by plaintiff A Center for Eating Disorders, L.L.C. ("ACED"). ACED opened its doors under the name Alabama Center for Eating Disorders and using the acronym ACED. Shortly thereafter, APS filed a trademark infringement lawsuit against ACED, arguing that ACED's name infringed on the name of APS's eating-disorder center. ACED voluntarily changed its name to A Center for Eating Disorders so that it could continue to use the acronym ACED, and the trademark-infringement lawsuit was dismissed. After MHCA refused to allow ACED to apply as a services provider for the network of mental-health professionals treating patients insured by Blue Cross Blue Shield of Alabama ("Blue Cross"), ACED filed its own seven-count lawsuit against APS, MHCA, and Blue Cross. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's order denying APS's and MHCA's motions for a judgment as a matter of law as to ACED's intentional interference-with-business-relations and conspiracy claims, and the Court reversed the order granting ACED's motion for a new trial. http://j.st/vMZ View Case on: Justia Google Scholar
Muccio v. HuntCourt: Arkansas Supreme Court Docket: CV-11-1273Opinion Date: January 30, 2014Judge: Hart Areas of Law: Bankruptcy, Business Law, Contracts, Injury Law Following the bankruptcy of BioBased Technologies, LLC, certain members of BioBased (Appellants) brought an action against other members, the members’ lawyers, and the managers of the corporation for fraud, breach of duty to disclose company information, conversion of membership interest, civil conspiracy, and breach of contract. The circuit court granted summary judgment on some claims, dismissed some claims, and found that the remainder of the claims were barred by collateral estoppel and res judicata. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment on Appellants’ claims for fraud, breach of duty to disclose company information, and conversion of membership interest claims based on Appellants’ lack of standing, as Appellants had standing to assert their claims; (2) the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment on Appellants’ fraud claim against certain defendants on the basis that Appellants “failed to meet proof with proof” to show that the defendants made false representations of fact; (3) the circuit court erred in dismissing claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction; and (4) the circuit court erred in concluding that the bankruptcy proceeding had res judicata or collateral estoppel effect on Appellants’ state-law claims. Remanded. http://j.st/v2S View Case on: Justia Google Scholar
Harman-Bergstedt, Inc. v. LoofbourrowCourt: Colorado Supreme Court Docket: 11SC926Opinion Date: January 27, 2014Judge: Coats Areas of Law: Business Law, Government & Administrative Law, Injury Law, Insurance Law, Labor & Employment Law Harman-Bergstedt, Inc. appealed the appellate court's decision to reverse an Industrial Claim Appeals Office decision disallowing respondent Elaine Loofbourrow's award of temporary disability benefits. The ICAO concluded that once respondent's treating physician placed her at maximum medical improvement, temporary total disability benefits could not be awarded for the injury for which she was initially treated. The appellate court concluded that under the circumstances of this case, such an independent medical exam was not a prerequisite to temporary total disability benefits. After its review of this case, the Supreme Court concluded the appellate court was correct in its decision: because a determination of maximum medical improvement has no statutory significance with regard to injuries resulting in loss of no more than three days (or shifts) of work time, respondent's award of temporary total disability benefits was not barred by her failure to first seek a division-sponsored independent medical examination. http://j.st/vPR View Case on: Justia Google Scholar
Farmers Nat'l Bank v. Green River DairyCourt: Idaho Supreme Court - Civil Docket: 40101Opinion Date: January 24, 2014Judge: Horton Areas of Law: Business Law, Commercial Law, Constitutional Law Appellant Farmers National Bank (FNB) appealed the district court's grant of declaratory judgment in favor of Green River Dairy, LLC, and four commodities dealers: Ernest Carter, Lewis Becker, Jack McCall, and Hull Farms (Sellers). FNB argued the district court misinterpreted I.C. 45-1802 (a statutory lien provision) and as a result, erred in granting Sellers a priority lien on collateral securing a loan previously made by FNB. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with FNB about the misinterpretation and vacated the district court's grant of declaratory judgment in favor of the Sellers. http://j.st/vgv View Case on: Justia Google Scholar
Schmutz v. TexasCourt: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Docket: PD-0530-13Opinion Date: January 29, 2014Judge: Alcala Areas of Law: Business Law, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Appellant signed an operating agreement with Priefert Manufacturing Co., Inc. to sell Priefert's farm and ranch equipment on consignment. Appellant agreed to sell this equipment at his retail store in Stephenville, located in Erath County. Priefert delivered its equipment to appellant's retail store from its headquarters in Mount Pleasant, Titus County. Appellant picked up inventory at Priefert's headquarters on several occasions and traveled back to his store. After making sales at his store, appellant reported them daily to Priefert's headquarters. Priefert then sent invoices to appellant for the wholesale price of the equipment that had been sold and the cost of the freight. After the businesses operated under the agreement for over two years, the relationship dissolved by early 2003, when appellant closed his store and admitted to using proceeds from the equipment sales to pay other financial obligations. Priefert filed civil and criminal complaints against appellant in Titus County to recover the unpaid invoices. Appellant filed for bankruptcy and discharged his civil liability. The criminal case, however, proceeded to trial. Appellant was indicted in Titus County for the offense of hindering a secured creditor by misappropriating the proceeds of secured property. The indictment alleged that venue lay in Titus County based on appellant's "sell[ing] or dispos[ing] of secured property" there. The undisputed facts at trial, however, showed that appellant sold property in Erath County. Appellant repeatedly challenged venue on the ground that he had not disposed of any property in Titus County, as the State had alleged in the indictment. On this basis, he filed a pretrial motion to quash, requested a directed verdict after the State rested its case-in-chief, and requested a jury instruction on the special venue provisions in Article 13.09. The trial court denied these requests. The jury convicted appellant of hindering a secured creditor and recommended community supervision. Appellant thereafter appealed. The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that venue error at trial is subject to a review for harm by using the standard for non-constitutional errors described in Rule 44.2(b) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. Applying that standard to this case, the Court concluded that the State's failure to prove venue as alleged was harmless because the record failed to show that appellant's substantial rights were affected by the venue of his trial, which occurred at one of the places permitted under Article 13.09 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, the specialized venue statute applicable to this case. http://j.st/v88 View Case on: Justia Google Scholar


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